Georgia Department of Public Safety v. Cleapor

Facts

On June 15, 2021, Donnie Cleapor was a passenger in a car driven by his daughter, Mariesa Young, in Macon-Bibb County when their vehicle collided with another car driven by James Ross, an employee of the Georgia Department of Public Safety (DPS). Both Cleapor and Young sustained injuries in the accident. 

Believing at the time that Ross was employed by the Georgia Department of Transportation (DOT), Cleapor and Young’s attorney sent a letter of representation to both the DOT and the Risk Management Division of the Department of Administrative Services (DOAS) on June 29, 2021.

On July 8, 2021, Cleapor received the crash report, which identified Ross’s vehicle as belonging to “Georgia Dep of Pub,” indicating DPS, not DOT, was the responsible state agency. A DOAS liability specialist later confirmed that DPS was the correct agency and set up a claim for both Cleapor and Young under the same case number.

Young subsequently sent an ante litem notice to DOAS and DOT in November 2021. Due to a clerical error, Young’s attorney mistakenly sent the notice to DOT instead of DPS. Despite this mistake, Young’s claim was settled with DPS in June 2022. Cleapor, however, did not serve his ante litem notice until May 11, 2022—almost a year after the accident—and, like Young, mistakenly sent it to DOT instead of DPS. He later filed a lawsuit on March 3, 2023, against Ross and DOT.

DOT moved to dismiss the case, arguing that it was not the correct agency and that Cleapor’s ante litem notice was defective under OCGA § 50-21-26. In response, Cleapor amended his ante litem notice and served it on DOAS and DPS on April 27, 2023, and moved to correct the named defendant by replacing DOT with DPS. The trial court denied DPS’s motion to dismiss, reasoning that Cleapor had substantially complied with the notice requirements. DPS appealed.

Issues & Holdings

1. Did Cleapor’s ante litem notice comply with OCGA § 50-21-26, even though it was originally sent to DOT instead of DPS?

Holding: No. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s ruling, holding that strict compliance with the ante litem notice requirement is mandatory and that Cleapor’s failure to name the correct agency in the initial notice rendered it ineffective.

2. Did DOAS’s involvement in processing both claims and settling Young’s claim impact the notice requirements?

Holding: No. The court held that DOAS’s role in facilitating settlements did not waive the state’s sovereign immunity or cure Cleapor’s defective notice.

Reasoning

1. Strict Compliance with Ante Litem Notice Requirements

Under OCGA § 50-21-26, a plaintiff bringing a claim against the State of Georgia must serve an ante litem notice to the correct state agency within one year of the alleged injury. The notice must be sent to DOAS and the state government entity alleged to be responsible.

The court emphasized that Georgia law requires strict compliance, not substantial compliance, with these notice provisions. Substantial compliance—such as mistakenly naming the wrong agency or serving the wrong department—does not satisfy the statutory requirement.

The appellate court distinguished this case from Cummings v. Georgia Dept. of Juvenile Justice, 282 Ga. 822 (2007), where the plaintiff reasonably believed DOT was responsible based on accident records at the time the ante litem notice was sent. In contrast, here, Cleapor had actual knowledge that DPS was responsible at the time he sent his ante litem notice but still listed DOT due to a clerical error. Because Cleapor knew the correct agency yet failed to name it in the notice, he did not act “to the extent of his knowledge and belief,” as required by OCGA § 50-21-26(a)(5).

2. DOAS’s Knowledge and Role in Settlement

The trial court reasoned that because DOAS had actual notice of Cleapor’s claim and had already settled Young’s claim, Cleapor’s notice substantially complied with the statute. The appellate court rejected this reasoning, citing Douglas v. Dept. of Juvenile Justice, 349 Ga. App. 10 (2019), which held that the state’s actual knowledge of a claim does not excuse a defective ante litem notice. Even though DOAS was involved in settlement discussions, the statutory burden remained on Cleapor to properly identify the correct agency in his notice.

3. Failure to Cure the Defective Notice

Cleapor attempted to cure the issue by filing an amended ante litem notice on April 27, 2023—nearly two years after the accident—and serving DPS. However, the appellate court reaffirmed that an amended notice sent after the one-year deadline does not cure a defective initial notice. The court cited Silva v. Dept. of Transp., 337 Ga. App. 116 (2016), where a plaintiff’s attempt to amend an untimely ante litem notice was rejected.

4. Harsh But Required Result

The court acknowledged the harsh outcome but reiterated that the legislature—not the courts—set the strict notice requirements for waiving sovereign immunity. The decision reaffirmed DeFloria v. Walker, 317 Ga. App. 578 (2012), where the court ruled that failing to meet the ante litem notice provisions deprives the trial court of jurisdiction over the case.

Conclusion

The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of DPS’s motion to dismiss, holding that Cleapor failed to strictly comply with the ante litem notice requirements under OCGA § 50-21-26. Because sovereign immunity was not waived, the trial court lacked jurisdiction, and Cleapor’s claims against DPS were dismissed.

This decision reinforces Georgia’s strict compliance standard for ante litem notices and serves as a warning for attorneys handling claims against government entities. Even minor clerical errors—such as listing the wrong agency—can result in complete dismissal of a client’s case.

Citation: Georgia Department of Public Safety v. Cleapor, No. A24A1071 (Ga. Ct. App. October 22, 2024)