Taylor v. The Devereux Foundation, Inc.

Learn the details of this case below, or watch this video explaining its significance:

 

Facts

Taylor v. The Devereux Foundation, Inc. arose out of the sexual assault of a 15-year-old girl at a behavioral health facility that the Defendant, Devereux Foundation, operated. The lawsuit was filed against Devereux and the Devereux employee who assaulted her.

After a trial, the jury returned a verdict of $10 million in compensatory damages. The jury apportioned the damages 50/50 between the employee and Devereux. Punitive damages of $50,000,000 were awarded against Devereux as well. Significantly, the punitive damages were based on the Plaintiff’s contention that Devereux acted with an “entire want of care” toward protecting the minor-victim and were not based on intentional misconduct or a specific intent to cause harm.

After the trial court enforced Georgia’s statutory cap on punitive damages of $250,000, the Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the punitive damages cap violated three rights under the Georgia Constitution: (1) the right to trial by jury, (2) the separation of powers, and (3) equal protection.

Issue and Holding

The issue was to determine whether the punitive damages cap as applied to Plaintiff’s punitive damages award violated the Georgia Constitution.

As applied to the facts of this case, the Georgia Supreme Court held that the cap did not violate the Georgia Constitution.

Reasoning

Before addressing each separate constitutional challenge, the Supreme Court set out the standard for evaluating the constitutionality of a statute. The Court cited well-established precedent in observing that duly enacted statutes have a presumption of constitutionality. The party challenging a statute must establish that the statute “manifestly infringes upon a constitutional provision or violates the rights of the people.” The conflict between the statute and the constitution must be “clear and palpable” and the Court must be “clearly satisfied of its unconstitutionality.” 

The Right to Trial by Jury

In evaluating the scope of the right to trial by jury and determining whether the punitive damages cap violated the right to a jury trial, the Court followed the framework Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, 286 Ga. 731 (2010). In Nestlehutt, the Supreme Court struck down Georgia’s cap on medical malpractice damages as a violation of the right to trial by jury.

Under this framework, the Court stated that the right to trial by jury was as it existed in 1798. This means that if the right to jury trial existed for the type of claim at issue as of 1798, then the Georgia Constitution’s right to trial by jury would attach. However, the right would not attach if there was not a right to trial by jury for that claim in 1798. In evaluating the history of the right, the Court stated that it should look to early Georgia cases and statutes, as well as the English common law of 1776, which Georgia adopted as the law in 1784.

The Georgia Supreme Court framed the issue as follows:  

if [Plaintiff] can show that at least one of her claims of liability against Devereux existed in Georgia in 1798 and that the kind of punitive damages she seeks were within the scope of her right to a jury trial on that claim, then the legislatively-imposed damages cap set forth in O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1(g) violates her right to a trial by jury under the Georgia Constitution.

With this standard in mind, the Court first evaluated whether the law in Georgia in 1798 recognized the right to a jury trial in premises liability cases. The Court concluded it did.  The Court then turned to whether the law in Georgia at that time recognized that juries could award “punishment damages” in certain situations. Again, the Court concluded it did.

The Court did not stop there, though. The Court then engaged in a very detailed analysis to determine the basis for punishment damages as of 1798. The Court noted that the only cases it could find involved an award of punishment damages for intentional misconduct. But the Court concluded that there was no evidence that English juries in 1776, or Georgia juries in 1798, could award punishment damages based on a defendant acting with an “entire want of care.” 

Because there was no showing that Georgia recognized a right to trial by jury for punitive damages arising out of an entire want of care in 1798, the Court held that the damages cap did not violate the Georgia Constitution’s right to trial by jury. The Court expressly recognized, though, that a punitive damages claim based on intentional misconduct is constitutionally protected by the right to a jury trial. This leaves open the possibility that future punitive damages cases in which the statutory cap would limit damages in a case involving intentional misconduct would be unconstitutional as applied to those cases. 

Separation of Powers

The Plaintiff’s second constitutional argument was that putting a ceiling constituted a legislative remittitur and only the judicial branch could issue a remittitur. The Court first reasoned that the legislature has the ability to define, limit, and modify available legal remedies. The Court concluded that creating punitive damages and defining their parameters is a legislative power. 

Turning to the Plaintiff’s argument that the cap constituted a legislative remittitur, the Court held that the cap did not constitute a remittitur because, unlike a judicial remittitur, the cap automatically applied. It did not involve anybody from the legislature weighing evidence and determining whether the jury’s award was excessive. 

Equal Protection

Third and finally, the Plaintiff argued that the law treated similarly situated plaintiffs differently based on the amount of damages awarded because plaintiffs with smaller punitive damages awards recovered a greater percentage of damages than those who had a larger award that was above the cap.

The Court concluded that no suspect class or fundamental right was implicated, so a rational basis test applied. The Court reasoned that a rational basis for the cap existed because the legislature could have concluded that a flat-sum cap, rather than a cap based on a percentage of the amount awarded, was sufficient to address the punishment and deterrence goals of punitive damages.

Conclusion

This decision is important for three reasons.

First, the Court reinforced the Nestlehutt analysis for evaluating constitutional challenges to damages caps under the constitutional right to a jury trial. This means that Nestlehutt still remains good law as applied to the medical malpractice damages cap that was struck down in that case. It also means that analysis will be used when evaluating any other laws, including damages caps, that would infringe on the right to have a jury make the decision. 

Second, the Court held that the cap is constitutional, as applied to claims involving an entire want of care. This can be viewed as a win for defendants, but it does not change the law. It merely preserves the status quo.

Lastly, the decision does raise the strong likelihood that the Court will strike down the cap in a future case involving intentional misconduct, or even some other conduct, that could have the basis for punitive damages in 1798. The current version of the punitive damages statute only provides for three exceptions to the cap:  (1) product liability claims; (2) a specific intent to cause harm; or (3) the defendant acted under in the influence of alcohol, drugs, glue, aerosol, or other toxic vapor.

It is not difficult to imagine scenarios where intentional misconduct may be present, but not fall within one of these three exceptions. While a specific intent to cause harm will almost always involve intentional misconduct, the opposite is not always true. There may be multiple situations where an intentionally wrongful act that gives rise to punitive damages does not necessarily involve a specific intent to harm the plaintiff.

For example, in a premises liability case, a defendant may intentionally create, or intentionally allow to exist, a dangerous condition. See, e.g., BBB Service Co. Inc. v. Glass, 228 Ga. App. 423 (1997). (Punitive damages authorized because the defendant knew the chemical it put on its floor caused the floor to become slippery but they “did not want to change what they were doing.”) In a motor vehicle case, the defendant-driver may have intentionally been speeding, or intentionally texting, at the time of the crash, even though the driver may not have specifically intended to harm anyone.

In short, there’s a difference between intentional misconduct and specific intent to cause harm. While many defendants may view Taylor as a victory, plaintiffs’ attorneys need to be aware of the limitations of the Court’s holding. There may be multiple opportunities to obtain punitive damages in cases involving intentional misconduct and have the cap declared unconstitutional as applied to those cases. Plaintiffs’ lawyers need to be aware of this when preparing their initial complaint and pleading punitive damages, during discovery when obtaining evidence to support an intentional misconduct claim, and when framing the issues at trial for the jury.

To learn more about The Champion Firm and the personal injury practice areas we cover, visit our main website here. If you’re an attorney seeking to refer a case or partner with us as co-counsel, please reach out here.

Citation: Taylor v. The Devereux Foundation, Inc., S22A1060 (S. Ct. Ga. Mar. 15, 2023)